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STANDING UNDER CLAYTON § 4:
A PROVERBIAL MYSTERY

INTRODUCTION
The Clayton Antitrust Act 1 provides recourse to "any person"
who is "injured" as a result of an antitrust violation. Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 2 the person injured "by reason of" any
violation of the antitrust laws may recover his damages threefold
from the party who has violated the laws. Although a strict interpretation of section 4 would appear to require only that the plaintiff prove his injury was the result of the violation, 3 the private
plaintiff has long been subjected to an additional burden. 4 The
plaintiff must establish not only a violation and an injury to his
business or property, but also that there is a direct connection between the two, i.e. that he is injured "by reason of" the violation. 5
The causal connection between the injury and the violation has
been referred to by the courts as a "standing" requirement.6 If the
connection does not exist, the plaintiff is promptly denied his right
7
to sue under section 4.
An antitrust violation can create an infinite chain of injury
caused by reason of the original violation. The standing decision is
basically a policy determination made by the courts only after they
have decided whether the injury suffered is of the type that was
meant to be protected by section 4. The problem the courts have
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) provides in part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor ...
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained.
4. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir.
1910).
5. The courts have seized upon this language in section 4 as requiring that the injury be in some way connected with the violation.
See Bookout v. Shine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir.
1958) (injury must be "direct" result of violation); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 419 (4th Cir. 1966)
(injury must be "proximate" result of violation); Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
923 (1971) (injury must be "foreseeable" result of violation).
6. See, e.g., Billy Baxter v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir.

1910).
8. Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d
1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).

faced in deciding the standing question is how and where to determine the point in the injury chain when policy dictates that the liability of the violator should end.9 Once a court decides where to
cut off the liability of the violator, it can then determine if the
plaintiff's injury is above or below the cut-off point and grant or
deny standing on that basis. The tests used by the courts to define
the point where liability ceases to exist under section 4 have created so much confusion that no one, other than a direct competitor, 10 can be assured that he has been injured by reason of the violation. Standing under section 4 has, as a result of the confusion,
become a proverbial mystery which can only be solved on a case
by case basis. 1 '
This Comment will discuss the concepts used by the courts to
determine if a private plaintiff has standing to sue under section 4,
the unresolved conflicts now existing among the circuit courts, and
the necessity of maintaining the standing requirement. The purpose is to find the common threads which can be used to define
those persons who are in fact injured "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... 12
I. TnE CAUSAL CONNECTION
A. HistoricalDevelopment
In the early cases involving treble damage recovery the courts
initially took a restrictive view of who had standing to sue. In
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,13 a stockholder and creditor of a bankrupt corporation brought suit against the Eastman Kodak Company
alleging that as a result of an antitrust violation 14 the plaintiff had
suffered a decrease in the value of his stockholdings. The lower
court determined that Loeb did not have standing to sue under section 7 of the Sherman Act15 and the decision was affirmed by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit held that the
bankrupt corporation was the one directly injured by the violation
and that it should be the one to bring the suit for treble damages.' 6
9.

See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).

10. See generally Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370

U.S. 690 (1962).
11. Compare Field Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 949 (1971) with Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d
1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). On similar factual
situations the plaintiff in Field Productions was denied standing, whereas
the plaintiff in Mulvey was granted standing.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
13. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
14. Loeb alleged that the defendant corporation entered into various
contracts, combinations in the form of trusts and otherwise, and restrained
interstate trade by monopolizing commerce in the photographic field.
Id. at 706.
15. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) was adopted
from the language of section 7 of the 1890 Sherman Act.
16. 183 F. at 709.
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As an alternative holding, the court denied the plaintiff standing
because there was no conspiracy or combination directed against
him, "[h]ence any injury which [the plaintiff] received was indirect, remote and consequential.'"
The decision in Loeb has been interpreted to mean that either
the plaintiff must have been "directly injured" by the acts of the
defendant,' 8 or that he must have been within "the segment of
the economy threatened by the breakdown in competitive conditions in a particular industry."' 9 Numerous cases 20 decided after
Loeb continued to restrict section 4 actions even though the restriction seems clearly repugnant to the wording of section 4 and to
the repeated pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 21
Despite the indications by the Supreme Court that there
should be no judicially imposed restriction in a private antitrust
action, the courts have chosen to limit treble damage recovery for
a variety of reasons. The limitation on potential plaintiffs has
been imposed in order to keep the impact of section 4 within reasonable bounds. 22 In Calderone EnterprisesCorp. v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit,2 the court stated that to allow treble damages to
anyone injured by reason of a violation would "result in an overkill, due to an enlargement of the private weapon to a caliber far
exceeding that contemplated by Congress.' 4 Not only would an
overkill result from such a liberal interpretation of section 4, but it
is conceivable that the entire economy would feel the impact of
such a crushing blow. 25 The unsuspecting businessman would un17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Bookout v. Shine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 295
(2d Cir. 1958).
19. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-5 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
20. See, e.g., Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
454 F.2d 1292, 1297 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), and
cases cited therein.
21. Although the Supreme Court has never accepted or rejected the
standing restriction, it has indicated that, "[T]his Court should not add
requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set
forth by Congress in those laws." Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957). See also Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas & Light
Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961); Mandeville Island Farms, Inv. v. American
Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948); Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures,
327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946).
22. See generally Comment, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
23. 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
24. Id. at 1295.
25. Consider the impact on General Motors should it be found guilty
of an antitrust violation. The corporation would be liable to an unknown
number of treble damage plaintiffs. Under a liberal interpretation of sec-

fairly be subjected to "liability of indefinable scope ' 26 and it is
possible that more than one plaintiff might recover treble damages
27
for the same injury.
It is apparent from the section 4 decisions over the last sixty
years that the courts have succumbed to the arguments that to enforce the literal words of the statute would produce a flood of litigation. 28 If the literal wording of section 4 was accepted, the attractiveness of a treble damage recovery would lure many unrealistic claims to the courts. The judicial system has time after
time attempted to balance the purpose and worth of the treble
damage remedy against the unfairness of permitting windfall damages to those who are only harmed incidently. 29 Depending upon
which way the balance was tipped, the courts have granted or denied standing.
B. The Direct Injury Test
Of the two standing tests set forth in Loeb, the one finding
early favor in the courts was the direct injury concept. The courts
required that a plaintiff seeking treble damages show that the conspiracy was directed against him and as a result he suffered damages. The alleged injury could not be a consequence of a conspiracy directed against someone else. 30 In Snow Crest Beverage v. Recipe Foods,31 the District Court for Massachusetts summarized the
spirit of the direct injury test as follows:
It is well settled that despite its broad language § 4 of
the Clayton Act does not give a private cause of action to
a person whose losses result only from an interruption or
diminution of profitable relationships with the party 3directly affected by alleged violations of the antitrust laws. 2
The rationale behind the demarcation between a derivative injury
and a direct injury is that the limitation furthers the purpose of the
act while at the same time precluding recovery for remote injury.
The courts have supported the division simply because it is "fair
tion 4, General Motors could incur enough liability to seriously damage its
financial position and as a result the entire economy would feel the impact.
26. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907,
909 (D. Mass. 1956).
27. Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 823 (D. Mass. 1909).
28. See, e.g., Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972);
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 133 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
29. See, e.g., Conference Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55
(9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
30. See, e.g., Bookout v. Shine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 294
(2d Cir. 1958); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F.
Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956); Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907
(1963).
31. 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
32. Id. at 909.
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and reasonable."38 A person situated in the economy in a position
where the impact of the violation will not affect him should not be
allowed to sue because of his relationship with a third party who
is a "target" of the conspiracy.3 4 Limiting standing to those against
whom the violation is directed establishes an "easily identifiable
cut-off that avoids ... opening the flood-gates to all. . .. "3,5
The thrust of the direct injury concept can be restated as follows: the plaintiff suing under section 4 must be a person against
whom the conspiracy is directed 36 or one who has had direct business contact with the violator. 37 If the necessary connection between the violation and the injury can be shown, the plaintiff's injury will be considered to be the direct result of the violation and
38
he will be granted standing to sue.

The simplicity of the direct injury concept appeared to build
definiteness into the standing determination under section 4. The
actual application of the test, however, has created a guessing game
among potential section 4 claimants. The distinction between a
direct injury and one which is "indirect, remote, and consequential"
is a subtle one indeed.3 9 Although it is not always clear who is directly injured, the courts have been able to define a direct injury
by negative inference. The courts have established that standing
does not exist for persons in the following categories: (1) general
stockholders of an injured corporation; 40 (2) officers 4 ' and creditors
of an injured corporation; 42 (3) employees of an injured corpora33.

Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d

1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1296.
36. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166, 170
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969).
37. See, e.g., Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp.
289, 309 (D. Colo. 1969).
38. See SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969) stating:
Standing to sue was not given by Congress to any and every citizen who, motivated by public spirit or possibly some baser reason,
would set himself up as a watchdog of business behavior. Congress
properly bestowed the right to sue on such persons as might be
[directly injured].
Id. at 171.
39. Compare Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d
383, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) and Snow Crest
Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956) with
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
40. See, e.g., Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957).
41. See, e.g., Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30
F. Supp. 389, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
42. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir.
1910).

tion; 4" (4) suppliers of an injured manufacturer; 44 (5) franchisors; 4" (6) licensors; 46 and (7) ultimate consumers. 47 In each of the
categories listed above the plaintiff was not considered to be the
object of the conspiracy or combination. The plaintiff's position
was insulated from the direct impact of the violation by the presence of another party who was considered by the courts to be directly injured. Although each plaintiff surely suffered an economic loss which resulted from the violation, 43 the loss was considered too remote to be remedied with treble damages, therefore,
no damages at all were allowed. Throughout the history of section
4 actions, there has always been a certain degree of policy determinations influencing the courts' decisions. 49 For the most part, these
factors have been left unexpressed in the decisions granting or denying standing. The courts, after balancing the policy factors involved in the cases, have been content to deny standing simply by
labeling the injury as "indirect," "remote," "collateral," "incidental," or "consequential. 50o The use of terms indicating a lack of
physical causation has done little to define a direct injury and the
decisions applying the concept are certainly not guiding lights for
the person contemplating a section 4 action. 5'
The courts have further complicated the affirmative use of the
direct injury concept by defining the meaning of direct in terms of
foreseeability 52 and proximate causation.5" The result reached under a foreseeability or proximate cause concept has been different
from that reached under a pure direct injury test. 54 As a result of
the confusion, the courts have tended to concentrate more on de43. See, e.g., Deaktor v. Fox Grocery Co., 332 F. Supp. 536, 541 (W.D.
Pa. 1971); Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D.
La.), affd, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963).
44. Cases cited note 39 supra.
45. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 189
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
46. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166, 170
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969).
47. See generally Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392
U.S. 481 (1968).
48. See Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957).
49. See, e.g., Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). (Listing some of the policy considerations influencing a standing determination).
50. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir.
1910); Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Private Antitrust Action, 21 A.B.A. AsrruST SECTION 341, 348 (1962).

51. Compare Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d
1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971) with Field Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd,
432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971) (reaching
opposite results on similar facts).
52. E.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190,
220 (9th Cir. 1964).
53. E.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton,
360 F.2d 414, 419 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
54. See note 51 supra.
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fining the physical causation labels and less on the purpose of section 4. One commentator has described the use of the judicially imposed direct injury test in the following manner:
[The "standing" tests], although seeming to have the virtue
of simplicity, fail to meet the real issue: the statutory purpose. To ask whether the plaintiff was 'directly injured'
is to ask the wrong question; what the court should ask is
whether the plaintiff (1) is, himself, within the class of
persons entitled to protection and (2) alleges an injury of a
type the statute was intended to guard against ....
5
As a result of the courts' misplaced emphasis, the direct injury
test has become one which is inconsistent, vague and ambiguous.6
The direct injury concept in its present state is little more than a
sign hung on the injury after it has been decided that treble damages should or should not be available to the plaintiff.57 The inability of the direct injury test to grant standing to one who was
not intentionally made a target of the conspiracy, but who was in
fact injured by the violation,5 8 has led to distorted applications of
the test.
In Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's Inc.,59 the court considered whether a landlord could recover treble damages for a decrease in rental payments resulting from a restriction on first run
movies in his theater. The plaintiff did not operate the theater but
leased it to one of the defendants for a minimum fixed rental plus
a percentage of the defendant's gross receipts. As a result of the
conspiracy, designed to control the showing of first run movies,
the plaintiff's theater was relegated to an inferior status. This
caused the plaintiff to receive less rental income under the lease
contract. The court considered the fact that there was privity between the plaintiff and at least one defendant and concluded that
the conspiracy was the "direct and proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injury.0 0
55. Comment, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section
4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570, 585 (1964).
56. Compare Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312
(E.D. Pa. 1953), af 'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828
(1954) with Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 248 F.2d 587 (7th Cir.
1957).
57. See Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454
F.2d 1292, 1302 (2d Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
930 (1972); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 191 (2d Cir.
1970) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
58. See Field Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp.
87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af 'd, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 949 (1971).
59. 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).

60.

Id. at 593.

The direct injury test appears to have been twisted completely
out of proportion in Congress Building. The injury to the plaintiff
could only be considered direct by negative inference since it was
not an injury resulting from the plaintiff's connection to an injured
third person.0 ' A correct application of the direct injury test, however, indicates that it is more likely that the injury was indirect because the violation was not aimed at the plaintiff's business.6 2 The
violation was aimed at the theater operators, not the theater owners, therefore, any loss suffered by the plaintiff must have been indirect. It taxes the imagination to conclude that the plaintiff's loss
of rental revenue was little more than a consequential result of the
violations. Consequential injuries have always been considered to
63
be too remote to warrant treble damage recovery.
In Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp.6 4 a similar factual
situation existed and the court adopted the privity rationale of
Congress Building. However, in suits brought by landlords whose
lessees were not defendants, but merely victims, there was no cause
of action. 65 The injuries to the landlords in both privity and nonprivity situations were identical, yet the direct injury test was used
to award treble damages in one case and not in the other. It can't
be said that the conspiracy was directed against the landlords for
then in either case there would be recovery. Furthermore, the
lack of privity is no bar to recovery under the direct injury concept, 66 and thus the mere existence of privity should not seriously
effect a standing decision. Under a proper application of the direct
injury test one is either found to be the target of the conspiracy or
he is not directly injured. There is no flexibility. 67
C.

The TargetArea Test

It became apparent from the result in Congress Building that
the direct injury test did not contain enough flexibility to encompass all persons deserving treble damage recovery. In order to inject an aspect of flexibility into the direct injury requirement, the
courts adopted a concept which became known as a target area
61.

See notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra.

62. See Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D.
Pa. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
(Holding on similar facts that the injury was "indirect").
63. See, e.g., Loeb v.,Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir.
1910).
64. 166 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
65. Id. at 624.
66. See, e.g., Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d
967, 971 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,,321 U.S. 792 (1944).
67. The Congress Building decision applied a certain degree of flexibility even though there is none under the direct injury concept. For the
Court's enlightened effort in Congress Building it has received heavy criticism from the legal commentators. See, e.g., Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32 A.B.A. ANTMrUSr
SECTION 5 (1966).
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test.68 If a section 4 plaintiff could show that he was within the
area against which the conspiracy was directed, his injury was
deemed to be direct.69
The target area concept stems from the wording used by the
court in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.7 0 It differs from Loeb's reasoning, however, because the target is not defined in terms of whom
the conspiracy is directed against, but instead, in terms of what
segment of the economy it is 'directed against. 71 The target area
2
label has, however, been carelessly used to identify both the person
73
and the area of the economy affected by the violation. To this extent the target area has incorporated the direct injury test.
In Conference of Studio Unions v. Lowe's Inc.,7 4 the court made
one of the first attempts to define the target area concept. In
Studio Unions the plaintiffs alleged that a violation existed in that
the defendants had conspired to destroy independent movie producers and refused to hire members of the plaintiffs' unions. The
court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action
and denied standing to sue for treble damages. The court stated
the conclusion in the following terms:
[I]n order to state a cause of action under the antitrust
laws a plaintiff must show more than that one purpose of
the conspiracy was a restraint of trade and that an act has
been committed which harms him. He must show that he
is within that area of the economy which is endangered by
a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. 75

The court's statement focused on an area of impact and indicated
that anyone therein was directly injured by reason of his position.
In Karseal v. Richfield Oil Corp.,7 6 the plaintiff seeking treble
damages was a wholesaler of car wax. The corporation distributed
its products to various independent service stations. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had entered into exclusive dealing
68. See Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th
Cir. 1955).
69. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
70. 183 F. 704 (1910).
71. See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54
(9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
72. See Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
73. See Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073, 1076
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
74. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
75. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
76. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).

agreements with independent service stations and prevented the
plaintiff from distributing its product to the stations covered by the
agreement.
In deciding the issue of Karseal's standing under section 4, the
court found that the defendant's violation was aimed at both manufacturers and distributors of competing car wax products, thus Karseal Corporation had sustained a direct injury." The court more
clearly articulated the Studio Union area concept as follows:
Or in other words, was Karseal within the 'target area' of
Richfield's illegal practices, ....Assuming Karseal was
'hit' by the effect of the Richfield antitrust violations, was
Karseal 'aimed at' with enough precision to entitle
78 it to
maintain a treble damage suit under the Clayton Act?
To the questions posed, the court answered that Karseal "was not
only hit, but was aimed at. . .

."9

This result was reached even

though it appears that the service stations or the competing manufacturers were the targets of the conspiracy. Under the rationale
of the strict direct injury test, the fact that Karseal was not on the
same level of competition with the defendant80 would make his injury derivative or consequential and standing would have been denied. 81
The Karseal decision, although defining the area of injury as
the target area, appeared to indicate that the direct injury concept
was still the basis of the decision. By using the terms "aimed at,"
"with enough precision," and "hit," the court stated the target area
concept in the form of against whom the violation was directed and
not in the form of an area concept.8 2 This created a question of
whether a person could be within a target area if the conspirators
did not intend to injure the particular individual claiming damages.
Stated another way, is one directly injured because of his position
within the endangered area or is one within the endangered area
only when he is first found to be directly injured?
In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn,8 3 the Ninth
Circuit clarified the terms "aimed at" and "hit" used in the Karseal
77. Id. at 362.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 365. But cf., Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963)
(stating that a supplier is "too remote and too far removed from the direct
injury to recover damages resulting from violations of the anti-trust laws
directed against the suppliers' customer.").
80. A distributor does not compete directly with a manufacturer, he
competes directly with other distributors and is thus one step removed from
the manufacturer.
81. Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383,
394-95 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963). But cf. Sanitary
Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 688-89 (8th
Cir. 1966) (allowing recovery for manufacturers and suppliers).
82. 221 F.2d at 362, 365.
83. 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964).
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decision. The court helped to answer the questions which developed as a result of Karseal by stating:
But in using the words 'aimed at' this court did not mean to
imply that it must have been a purpose of the conspirators
to injure the particular individual claiming damages.
Rather, it was intended to express the view that the plaintiff must show that, whether or not then known to the conspirators, plaintiff's affected operation was actually in the
area which it could reasonably be foreseen would be af84
fected by the conspiracy.
By incorporating foreseeability into the test used to determine
standing under section 4, the Ninth Circuit expanded the class of
persons who should be protected. A plaintiff within the target
area is considered to be injured by reason of his position and thus
the proof of the causal connection becomes much easier. This approach should be contrasted with the more restrictive direct injury
test. The direct injury test, although frequently incorporating target area language,85 places the plaintiff within the impact area
only after it is found that he is directly injured.
D. The Unresolved Conflicts
With the independent development of the two views on standing under section 4, it should not be a surprise to discover that the
circuit courts have reached opposite conclusions on similar, if not
identical, factual situations.8 6 The present state of the conflict is
so intense that it might be wise for a person seeking treble damages
to forego a detailed analysis of the case law and simply institute
his action in a jurisdiction adhering to a liberal interpretation of
standing.
In Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 7 the Ninth Circuit
reiterated the foreseeable target area concept it had developed in
Karsealand Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. The plaintiff seeking treble damages was the owner of a motion picture which he
had sold outright to Samuel Goldwyn Productions, Inc. The sales
contract called for a down payment plus a percentage royalty from
the distribution of the film. Mulvey's contractual interest was acquired by the defendant after the Goldwyn Corporation was dissolved. The defendant packaged the plaintiff's film with forty-five
84. Id. at 220 (emphasis added). See also Hoopes v. Union Oil Co.,
374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967) (articulating the foreseeability concept).
85. See Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
454 F.2d 1292, 1294 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
86. See notes 11, 39 and 56 supra.
87. 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).

other films and licensed the bundle. 8 The plaintiff contended that
because of the antitrust violation he suffered a decrease in his percentage royalty payments. The court granted the plaintiff standing
to sue after it concluded that he "was 'hit' as squarely as Karseal
and Hoopes: He was neither sideswiped not struck by a carom
shot."8 9 A literal translation would be as follows: The plaintiff's
injury was one which the court decided should be guarded against
by section 4 and thus the plaintiff had standing to sue.
In arriving at the decision in Mulvey, the court first outlined
the target area and then concluded that the plaintiff was within
that segment of the economy. The court stated that although the
defendant's activities were directed "at the means of distributing
films," 90 the purpose was to reduce the revenue producing potential
of the films.91 "Consequently, it [was] entirely foreseeable that
Goldwyn's blockbooking could impair the profit potential of Mul"92
vey's film .
A review of the reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit in Mulvey
discloses that if the violation was directed "at the means of distributing films" then Mulvey must have been "struck by a carom
shot." For how else could the violation hit a target area that it
was not aimed or directed at. The answer apears to be that Mulvey gave lip service to the foreseeable target area test, while it decided the issue strictly on the basis of foreseeability.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has continuously refused
to follow the Ninth Circuit's foreseeable target area test. 3 In
Field Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.,94 the plaintiff also
suffered a decrease in royalty payments resulting from the defendant's blockbooking method of distribution. The Second Circuit,
steeped in the tradition of the direct injury test, denied the plaintiff standing. The court defined those affected by the violation to
be the television stations and other distributors "who are com88. Film packaging is known in the industry as "blockbooking" and
is a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). See,
e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
89. 433 F.2d at 1076. In using the terms "neither sideswiped nor
struck by a carom shot," the court is discounting the possibility that
Mulvey's injury was indirect.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Field Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd,
432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 923, reh. denied, 401 U.S. 1014 (1971); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
94. 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff)d, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971)..
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pelled to accept motion pictures that they do not want .... -95
Therefore, the court concluded that the violation was not directed
against the plaintiff. The cause of the plaintiff's injury was thus
allocation of royalty payconsidered to be the result of improper
6
ments and not the antitrust violation
The decisions in Mulvey and Field Productions add one more
variable to the standing determination under section 4. The plaintiff must not only gamble on whether his injury is direct, but also
on what the courts will decide is the target against which the conspiracy or combination is directed.
97
The other circuits have lined up on both sides of the conflict
and have even added a few new twists to the standing concept. In
South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton,9 8 the
Fourth Circuit adopted the target area concept but in so doing it
considered the plaintiff's injury, not in terms of foreseeability, but
in terms of proximate causations.9 9 Defining the injury in terms of
proximate causation does not help to clarify the standing requirement and the approach should probably be dismissed as a careless
choice of words. South Carolina Council is not the only case which
has attempted (maybe inadvertently) to develop a new standing
concept. In Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 00 a district court in the
Ninth Circuit imposed a two pronged standing test. The court
stated that in order to have a section 4 cause of action, "the claimed
injury must be directly and proximately caused by the proscribed
acquisition" and "the injured must be one of the components of the
95. Id. at 88.
96. Id.
97. The Ninth Circuit's more liberal target area concept is shared by
the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals. See,
e.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d
414, 419 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Dailey v. Quality
School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1967); Congress Building
Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 246 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 1957); Sanitary Milk
Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 689 (8th Cir. 1966).
The Second Circuit's more restrictive view is supported by the Third,
Sixth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals. E.g., Harrison v. Paramount
Pictures, 115 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1953), afj'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954); Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907
(1962); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Ass'n of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d
925, 928 (10th Cir. 1967). But cf., H.F.S. Co. v. American Standard, Inc.,
336 F. Supp. 110, 115-16 (D. Kan. 1972) (accepting both the target area and
the directness test); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699,
702 (D. Colo. 1970) (indicating both tests are incorrect).
98. 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
99. Id. at 419.
100. 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969).

competitive infra-structure of the relevant market involved in the
complaint."' 01 At first glance it would appear that the court has
simply reiterated the Ninth Circuit's foreseeable target area concept. An analysis shows, however, that the test is but yet another
hybrid. Under the foreseeability concept if one is within the "competitive infra-structure of the relevant market involved" he will be
deemed to be directly injured by reason of his position within the
economy. There is no separate requirement that the plaintiff be a
person against whom the violation was directed. 10 2 Conversely,
if one is found to be directly injured there is no additional requirement that he be "one of the components of the competitive infrastructure."10 3
The Tenth Circuit, although not adding a new standing test,
has been unique in its inability to adopt one. The court has simply
not been able to distinguish between a target area test and a direct
injury test. In Nationwide Auto Appraiser Service v. Association
of C. & S. Co.,' 0

4

the court reached the conclusion that target area

was simply another name for direct injury and stated, "we need
not seek some new language to express the same doctrine."' 0 5 Although the court has been criticized for making the statement, 0 6
it is not completely incorrect. As previously noted,' 0 7 the target
area has been used to define both the person against whom the conspiracy was directed and the area against which it was directed.
When the term is used to refer to the person, it is little or no different from the direct injury concept.1 08 However, when the term
101. Id. at 90.
102. See Johnson v. Ready Mix Concrete Co., 318 F. Supp. 930 (D.
Neb. 1970) stating:
Generally speaking, however, the injury suffered is direct and
proximate when it occurs within that area of economic activity
which it could reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the
antitrust violation.
Id. at 933.
103. Id. See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219 (1948) stating:
The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers.
The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all
who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated.
Id. at 936. See also Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 188
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co.,
374 F.2d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 1967).
104. 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
105. Id. at 928.
106. See Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
454 F.2d 1292, 1302-3 (2d Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 930 (1972).
107. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
108. Consider how the term target area is used to indicate the same
thing as the direct injury test in the following quotation: "[I]n order to
have 'standing' . . . a person must be within the 'target area,' i.e., a person
against whom the conspiracy was aimed. . . ." Calderone Enter. Corp. v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. de-
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is used to refer to the foreseeable impact area, it is very much different from the direct injury concept. With the present confusion
surrounding the two standing tests it is not difficult to see how one
district court within the circuit could express a preference for both
tests 09 and another could doubt that either test was correct. 110
E. A Possible Solution
The present state of the decisional conflict on section 4 standing
highlights the desperate need for a uniform approach. The approach must be one which is consistent with the existing policy
considerations and it must be flexible enough to undergo future
change without confusion.
In Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 1 1 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals provided a realistic approach to the standing concept. The plaintiff seeking treble damages under section 4 was a
franchisor who merely licensed the information needed for the
manufacture of carbonated beverages. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had attempted to exclude him from distributing his
product by using various antitrust practices. In reaching the decision that the plaintiff was not injured by reason of the violation,
the court applied a test which was neither a strict direct injury
concept nor a foreseeable target area concept.
Recognizing the policy nature of a standing decision, the court
stated:
[The "direct" test and the "target area" tes1t do not provide talismanic guides to decision, but they do indicate the
need to examine the form of the violation alleged and the
11 2
nature of its effect on a plaintiff's own business activties.
The court examined the nature of the violation and outlined the
area of impact. The target area was defined as "the marketing of
bottled beverages." 113 The court next examined the plaintiff's connection with the defined target area. A comprehensive analysis
revealed that the plaintiff was not in the distribution chain for
nied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). The target area as applied in the quoted manner is not a target area test at all; it is a direct injury test disguised with
additional verbiage. First the person is found to be directly injured and
then he is circumscribed within a target area.
109. See H.F. & S. Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 110,
115-16 (D. Kan. 1972).
110. See Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 702
(D. Colo. 1970).
111. 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
112. Id. at 187 (emphasis supplied).
113. Id. at 188. Billy Baxter did not market or manufacture the products bearing his name, he merely licensed the process.

bottled beverages. Furthermore, the plaintiff was not a firm
"with comprehensive responsibilities for and identification with the
beverages. 11 4 The court's conclusion, following from the analysis,
was that the violation could not have been a "substantial factor"
115
in the injury.
The reasoning used in Billy Baxter was not substantially different from that which is inherent in other decisions." 6 The policy
factors were considered in the determination of whether the plaintiff's connection to the impact area was material or substantial.
The major difference in the method used was that the court found
a happy medium between the two previous standing tests. The requirement of a substantial connection is more liberal than the direct
injury test, yet it is more restrictive than the foreseeable target
area concept. The fact that the impact area is defined independently, and not as a result of the desired outcome, forces the court
to expose its reasoning for denying standing. Under the rationale
of Billy Baxter the courts cannot simply hide behind nebulous
terms such as "indirect," "remote" and "consequential." The reasoning for denying standing must be expressed in order to reach
the decision.
The Billy Baxter approach still possesses a 'degree of uncertainty. The definition of what is a material or substantial connection to the market is one which will change as the courts expand
or contract the class of persons who has standing under section 4.
The advantage of this approach is that the words "substantial" or
"material" can be expanded to encompass those persons that should
be granted standing without seriously undermining the basic premise of the test.

1 17

A principle which would compliment the rationale used in
Billy Baxter is one urged by the court in Calderone Enterprises
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit."8 After reviewing the
policy considerations found to exist in the section 4 "standing" decisions, the court urged that:
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. It appears that if the foreseeable target area concept had been
applied, the conclusion would have been identical. If the plaintiff's connection to the area of impact is not substantial it is not likely that he would
be encircled within the foreseeable target area. On the other hand, if the
direct injury concept had been applied the injury would have been labeled
indirect because the violation was not directed against the plaintiff.
Although the result would have been the same under either test, the
opinion of the court would not have shed as much light on the reasoning
used to reach the result. To deny standing because the injury is indirect or
not within the target area would simply be a substitution of words in
place of the comprehensive written analysis conducted by the court in
Billy Baxter.
117. See generally Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 246 F.2d 587
(7th Cir. 1957) (distorting the basic concept upon which the direct injury
test is based).
118. 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
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[I] t is necessary to use a rule of reason in construing the
requirements of § 4 of the Clayton Act as to standing,
just as such a rule has been adopted by courts in -determining whether restraints ...
transgress §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. 11 9
The independent determination of a target area, a subsequent
analysis of the plaintiff's connection thereto, and the use of a "rule
of reason" in construing the requirements of section 4 might well
be the solution the courts have been searching for for more than
six decades.
II.

THE INJURY

A. The Fact of Injury
As a result of the judicial determination of section 4, the plaintiff cannot be guaranteed of a successful action by simply proving
an antitrust violation. The "mere existence of the violation is not
sufficient ipso facto to support the action.' 12 0 The plaintiff must
be personally "injured in his business or property by reason of" the
violation. 121 As previously discussed, the plaintiff must prove a
causal connection between the injury and the violation in order to
be granted standing. 122 If the connection is a standing requirement, then it must also be that the fact of injury is a standing
determination; for if there is not in fact an injury, the plaintiff can
123
never be considered injured by reason of the violation.
One area which has created uncertainty in proving the fact of
injury is the definition of what constitutes business or property.
In Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 24 the court expressed the
view that there was flexibility in the legal content of the terms
"business or property." It stated:
In the absence of a statutory specification of the attributes
of 'business or property,' the courts have spelled out on an
119. Id. at 1295.
120. Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 743 (1944).
121. See, e.g., Carswell Trucks, Inc. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 334 F. Supp.
1238, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
122. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
123. It should be pointed out that although damage and injury are
generally considered synonymous terms, there is a distinction in section 4
actions. The fact of injury must be proven with certainty because it is a
prerequisite to bringing the action. The amount of injury or damage does
not require the same degree of certainty because it is a factual determination. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264
(1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555, 562 (1931).
124. 231 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

ad hoc basis the factual situations that measure up to the
required showing of 'business or property' .... 125
Although the terms "business and property" have been interpreted in accord with their ordinary and usual meaning, 12 6 there
has been confusion in the use of the terms. The question has
arisen concerning whether a person who was prevented from entering a business because of a violation could claim he was "injured
in his business or property.' 1 27 In American Banana Co. v. United
1 25
Fruit,
the court discussed an interpretation of section 4 which
would include a person who was prevented by the violation from
entering a particular business. The court stated:
Now in order to state a cause of action for damages under
the statute, it is not necessary to aver an injury to an existing business. As stated by this court . . . , 'it is as unlawful to prevent a person from engaging in business as it is
to drive a person out of business.' But it is necessary to
state facts showing an intention and preparedness to engage
1 29
in business.
The statement in American Banana has not, however, received universal acceptance. In Duff v. Kansas City Star Co.,1 83 the
plaintiff seeking treble damages had published a newspaper in
Kansas City until World War II. In 1951, eight years after he had
ceased his operation, the plaintiff attempted to re-enter the field of
newspaper publishing. The plaintiff stated that he had located an
office, made arrangements to have the paper printed and had conducted some sampling of the advertising market. The plaintiff also
alleged that he possessed the necessary capital, ability and present
intention to enter the publishing business. The complaint was
based on the fact that because of the defendant's attempt to monopolize the market, the plaintiff was prevented from starting his
operation.
The court, without reference to American Banana, stated that
the plaintiff could not seek "damages by reason of loss of anticipated profits in an anticipated business." 13' The pivotal question
asked by the court was whether the plaintiff had an established
business. The court found that since there was no business then
125. Id. at 81.
126. See Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp.
237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956).
127. Compare Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) with Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320 (8th Cir.
1962).
128. 166 F. 261 (2d Cir. 1908), aff'd on other grounds, 213 U.S. 347
(1909).
129. Id. at 264. See also Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306
F. Supp. 289, 307 (D. Colo. 1969) (stating that the quoted passage is "a succinct, and to this day accurate, statement of the law").
130. 299 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1962).
131. Id. at 323.
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there could not be an injury to that business.'3 2
Numerous cases, decided both before and after Duff, do not accept the conclusion reached by the Eighth Circuit.13 3 The courts,
however, limit the class of potential plaintiffs claiming they were
barred from the affected market by requiring more than a mere
hope or expectation of entry. 134 The cases dealing with the plaintiff's anticipated entry have established two significant requirements for determining if a plaintiff has suffered an injury. "First,
there must be the intention to enter the business; and second, there
must be a showing of preparedness to enter the business."'1 5 This
concept has become known as the intention and preparedness
test. 3 6
In Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 3 7 the court made a comprehensive examination of factors which could be used to determine
if the necessary intention and preparedness required for a section
4 injury did in fact exist. The court considered the following elements as material in making a determination of injury:
1. The background and experience of the claimant in the
prospective business
2. Some affirmative action on the claimant's part to engage in the proposed business
3. The financial ability to purchase the necessary equipment and facilities to engage in the business
4. The consummation of contracts by the claimant.138
The elements enumerated in Waldron have been applied in numerous cases to determine whether the plaintiff, alleging injury to -

anticipated enterprise, is in fact injured in his business or prop13 9
erty.
The courts do, however, require something more than mere
subjective intent to establish a new enterprise. In N.W. Controls,
132. Accord Control Data Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 306
F. Supp. 839, 845 (D. Minn. 1969), alf'd, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970);
La Rouche v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 166 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mass. 1958).
133. See, e.g., Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp.
289, 307 (D. Colo. 1969) and cases cited therein.
134. See generally Peller v. Int'l Boxing Club, Inc., 277 F.2d 593 (7th
Cir. 1955); Deterjet Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348 (D.
Del. 1962).
135. Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir.
1966).
136. See Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 308
(D. Colo. 1969). For a good analysis of the concept see Woods Exploration & Pro. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
137. 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
138. Id. at 81-82 (Citations omitted).
139. See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633-34
(5th Cir. 1966) and cases cited therein.

Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp.140 the plaintiff alleged that because
of a tie-in sales program conducted by the defendant, it was prevented from entering the market of selling electric shift control
boxes for outboard motorboats. The court applied the intention
and preparedness concept and reached the following conclusions:
(1) the plaintiff had never manufactured any devices activated by
electricity; (2) the plaintiff had not considered producing electric
shift control boxes; and (3) the plaintiff's preliminary negotiations
141
were insufficient to constitute intention to enter the market.
The result was that the plaintiff had not shown the fact of injury
which is a prerequisite in section 4 actions.
Even if the plaintiff can successfully show the fact of injury
to his business or property, he still must contend with the causal
connection requirement of standing. The proof of some injury is
only the starting point in a section 4 action. The major problem is
not the type of injury suffered, but rather the directness of that
injury. As a result, the definition of injury contemplated by section 4 can only be identified with reference to what is determined
to be direct or foreseeable.
CONCLUSION

The judicially imposed standing requirement under section 4
is one which has not seen the end of conflict and re-evaluation.
The present split 142 concerning the required causal connection between the injury and the violation is one which will continue to be
a battle ground for years to come. As long as the Supreme Court
is content to avoid the issue of section 4 standing, the proverbial
mystery will continue. 14' Without a solution, the private claimant
will be forced to gamble the high cost of antitrust litigation against
the whims of the court on every section 4 action. The plaintiff's
right to make a claim will continue to be uncertain every time he
seeks treble damages.
If it is necessary to continue to restrict the treble damage remedy, then the courts of their own volition must come together on
the standard to be used. The present concept of standing is such
that the requirements for an injury in one jurisdiction may not be
the same as in another.14 4 An analysis of the case law under section 4 indicates that even the courts are unclear on the proper
standing test to be applied. 45 Although the Second Circuit has
been traditionally more restrictive on the class of persons entitled
to sue under section 4, its decision in Billy Baxter provides a ra140.
141.
forth in
142.
143.
144.
145.

333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971).
Id. at 507. This analysis is consistent with the guidelines set
Waldron.
See note 97 supra.
See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 11, 39, 56 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 104-5 and accompanying text supra.
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tional approach to the standing determination. 14 By requiring a
detailed analysis of the affected market and the plaintiff's connection thereto, the court has in fact provided the basis for analyzing
the merits of a potential section 4 claim prior to litigation.
Terms such as "direct-indirect," "remote," "consequential,"
"target area," "foreseeable injury" and "proximate causation" are
little more than 'decisional labels used to disguise a preconceived
policy determination of injury. Although such terms are difficult
to define, they are necesary determinations made by the courts to
restrict the class of section 4 claimants. Taken out of the context
of each factual situation, the terms do little or nothing to define
those intended to be within the scope of the section.
The criticism that can be leveled at the courts for using such
terms is that each factual situation is distinct and although the labels might well apply, their use tends to hide the policy basis for
the decision. If the terms are used to classify an injury only after
the court has analyzed the entire realm of each claim in light of
the rule of reason, 147 they acquire meaning sufficient to define the
class of section 4 plaintiffs. If a court follows the Billy Baxter
approach, 14" it will make little difference which label it chooses to
place on the injury; the analysis and not the label will prove that
the plaintiff should or should not be allowed to sue for treble
damages.
D. RicHARD FuNK

146. See notes 111-17 and accompanying text supra.
147. This phrase is borrowed from the determination of whether a restraint violates §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. See Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
148. See notes 111-17 and accompanying text supra.

